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1. Introduction 
In this paper we draw on the results from a survey of train operating companies 
(TOCs) to demonstrate potential and actual discriminative behaviour of a vertically in-
tegrated railway network supplier (DB Netz AG) in Germany against new entrants on 
the downstage-market. 
The German railway market is characterised by the vertically integrated Deutsche 
Bahn AG (DB AG) which is, on the one hand, the monopolistic owner of the physical 
railway network (upstream market) and, on the other hand, a dominating transport pro-
vider on the downstream market. In general, vertical integration describes a market 
structure in which a firm undertakes two or more separable production stages.1 Given 
this vertical relationship between the upstream network market and the downstream 
transport level, the network operator (DB Netz AG) has an incentive to discriminate2 
between its own TOCs – DB Reise & Touristik, DB Regio AG and Railion – and their 
competitors, which have been able to access the railway network since the beginning of 
the railway reform in 1994.3 This discriminative behaviour can result in higher prices 
for the newcomer regarding access to railway network or to other facilities that are re-
quired to provide transport services.4 In the extreme case, vertical foreclosure can result, 
which is a consequence of the upstream monopolist’s incentive to raise rivals’ costs to 
an untenable level.5 If vertical foreclosure is impossible due to regulation, the network 
monopolist can hinder new entrants and competitors of its own transport companies 
from accessing the market by other non-price (i.e. qualitative) instruments. In the first 
instance, this behaviour aims at the provision of network services having different quali-
ties. For example, an allocated railway slot can be narrowed by the sudden initiation of 
railway maintenance. Thus, the slot can not be realised so that the owner of this slot is 
not able to transport his product to the final customer. Likewise, the minimum require-
ments of railway vehicles can represent a structural barrier for entering the market. 
                                                 
1 See Kruse (1997). For examples of vertical integrated market see Vickers (1995). For the economic 
reasons of vertical integration see Williamson (1989). 
2 In the following, discrimination means the unequal treatment of equal facts and, vice versa, the equal 
treatment of unequal facts; see Aberle and Eisenkopf (2003). 
3 See exemplary Aberle and Brenner (1996) for content and realisation of the German railway reform. 
4 See King (1999) for the claim of downstream competitors that the provider sells access at a lower price 
to its own down stream subsidiary than to competitors. 
5 See Buehler (2003). 
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In formulating a regulation, it is necessary to clarify whether the targeted facility 
(i.e. railway network) is essential for the supply of rail transport in the final market. A 
so-called ‘essential facility’, which must be provided to competitors, exists if 
a) the facility is unalterable to reach the transport customers and/or to enable busi-
ness activity for the competitor, 
b) it is impossible for the competitive petitioner to duplicate the facility under suit-
able expenditure (no potential substitute), 
c) it is impossible for the competitive petitioner to use any alternative facility (no 
active substitute).6 
To constitute an essential facility, these three prerequisites must be in effect simul-
taneously. 
A questionnaire survey has been administered to selected TOCs to estimate the ac-
tual and potential discrimination. Actual discrimination describes strategies which di-
rectly have an effect on the competitors and/or potential entrants, whereas potential dis-
crimination describes the possibility of discrimination as a threatening potential. This 
discriminatory potential of the DB AG – as a vertically integrated railway undertaking – 
often is thought to be an important barrier for competition.7 The present analysis begins 
with a description of the survey design and the survey instrument. Subsequently, the 
results are presented. Finally, based on the survey results, possible options regarding an 
efficient organisation and regulation of the railway system in Germany are proposed. 
2. The questionnaire survey amongst TOCs 
Selection of TOCs/target population 
The target population includes all TOCs with efforts to accessing the DB AG rail-
way network. This selection criterion led to a final number of 152 TOCs.8 These TOCs 
operate in various rail transport markets: freight transport (FT), regional passenger 
transport (RPT) and long-distance passenger transport (LPT). It is also possible that 
TOCs operate simultaneously in different markets. 
                                                 
6 See Rottenbiller (2002) and Knieps (2001). 
7 See Aberle and Eisenkopf (2002). 
8 The selection is based on the Competition Report of the DB AG; see Deutsche Bahn AG (2003a). 
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Basically, TOCs can be divided into state-owned TOCs9 and private TOCs. Regard-
ing their ownership structure, private TOCs can be distinguished between international 
transport groups (ITG), medium-sized private TOCs (MPT), industrial TOCs (IT) and 
local-state TOCs (LST). The following Fig. 1 shows the output volumes in respect to 
the market (FT, RPT and LPT): 
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Fig. 1: Market output volumes in 200210 
Fig. 1 demonstrates the high market dominance of the DB AG-TOCs in comparison 
to the private TOCs. The most evident domination of the DB AG is represented at the 
LPT market. The RF market is characterized by increasing market shares of private 
TOCs, especially concerning freight transport by block trains over long distances. Nev-
ertheless, the DB AG still has an undisputed market position. Recently, the DB AG has 
taken over the Stinnes AG to strengthen its market position.11 Since 1996 the federal 
states have been ordering the regional passenger transport from the TOCs. The states 
can do so by direct placing or by competitive invitations to bid (competition for the 
market). Due to this practice, private TOCs are able to increase their market shares, 
however attended by decreasing subsidies. From the point of view of the dominant posi-
tion of the DB AG-TOCs on the transport market, the vertical integration of railway 
                                                 
9 As a rule, these are TOCs of the DB AG: Railion (FT), DB Regio AG (RPT) and DB Reise & Touristik 
AG (LPT) and their subsidiary companies, respectively. 
10 See VDV (2003), Deutsche Bahn AG (2003b) and own calculations. 
11 The former freight TOC of the DB AG, the DB Cargo, now has the firm-name “Railion” (since Sep-
tember 2003). In this paper we use the former firm-name DB Cargo because the survey has been executed 
before the take-over of the Stinnes AG. 
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network and transport subsidiaries offers an instrument to hinder competitors in access-
ing the market. 
Sample and questionnaire response 
The sample of TOCs was designed by a qualitative selection, which was supported 
by experts like VDV, EBA and railway consultants. Altogether, the questionnaire sur-
vey was sent to 86 TOCs showing competitive market behaviour. The addressed TOCs 
cover between 94 % (RPT) and 100 % (FT and LPT) of the market volume with respect 
to the performance of the target population (compare Fig. 1). Thus, the survey includes 
the most important TOCs of the railway market. 
37 TOCs responded to the questionnaire survey, equaling 43 % of the selected 
TOCs. Considering the sensitive content of the questionnaire, this represents an accept-
able value. The market performances of the responding TOCs cover between 52 % 
(FT), 60 % (RPT) and 100 % (LPT) of the sample performances. In comparison to the 
lower total response-quota (43 %), the most powerful TOCs have replied. 
3. The results 
In this section, we present items with relevance to discriminatory behaviour based 
on the vertical integration of the DB AG. Firstly, we show the results concerning as-
pects of price-discrimination. Thereafter, aspects of non-price-discrimination will be 
addressed.12 
3.1 Price discrimination 
Track access charges 
The railway network can be regarded as an essential facility according to the defini-
tion on page 2. From there, it must be opened for new entrants in exchange for a suit-
able fee. A general exclusion is not allowed.13 Given the vertical integration of the rail-
way network and transportation, DB Netz is able to impede access through the level and 
                                                 
12 It bears noting that the results are rather subjective market estimations of the addressed TOCs instead of 
endurable and objective items with regard to an inference of an optimal regulative organization of the 
railway market. Nevertheless, the results can point to discrimination of competitors of the DB AG caused 
by vertical integration. 
13 See § 14 AEG as the national legislation of a guaranteed non-discriminating access to railway network. 
The international regulation for a non-discriminating network access is given by the guideline (RL) 
2001/14 of the European Commission. 
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structure of charges. Considering that railway network costs are responsible for about 
25 % of all costs for transportation services, this is an instrument of discrimination that 
should not be underestimated. 
The track access charges system (TACS) of 1998 was characterised by a two-part 
tariff. Depending on the demanded track kilometres, one could choose a so-called ‘In-
fracard’ as a fixed cost block in combination with a low variable price for track kilome-
tres. This implies a degression of the average costs. Alternatively, a linear so-called 
‘Variopreis‘ could be selected in case of a lower demand of track kilometres. This 
TACS was criticised by the German Federal Cartel Office (BKartA) because it favours 
TOCs with high demand of track kilometres, namely the TOCs of the DB AG (up to 
40 % lower average costs). The new TACS – implemented in 2001 – is linear, which 
suppresses the incentive to expand the demand. Conclusively, a TACS is characterised 
by the trade-off between competitive neutrality (linear system) and economic incentives 
for additional demand (two-part tariffs). 
The following Fig. 2 shows the evaluation of the track access charges level and the 
price system structure by the questioned TOCs. As a relative benchmark, the price level 
and the structure of private railway infrastructure operators (Pr-RIO) were evaluated. 
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Fig. 2: Rail track access charges – Level (l.) and structure (r.) 
More than 80 % answered that the track access charges of DB Netz are too high, 
whereas 53 % assessed the access charges of private RIOs as being too high. This sug-
gests a relative high charge level for DB Netz, and – diminished – for private RIOs. A 
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more positive opinion exists regarding the track charge structure, again with advantages 
for private RIOs. 40 % of the responents said that the access charges structure of DB 
Netz is suggested as advantageous for buyers of high volumes of track kilometres. On 
the other hand, more than 51 % hold that the access charges structure of DB Netz is 
neutral – with no advantages for buyers of high or low volume. Moreover, 8.6 % say 
that the TACS is profitable to buyers of low volumes as a result of the linear tariff.14 
Hence, a significant discrimination by track access charges (level and structure) could 
not be noticed. Due to the fact that the track access charge system is directed by the DB 
AG (holding company)15 – and not by DB Netz as an autonomous infrastructure opera-
tor – the general incentive to discriminate competitors of DB-TOCs persists. 
Regional factors 
Due to the control of track access charges by the German competition authority 
(BKartA), the railway infrastructure operator’s (DB Netz) room to discriminate com-
petitors via access pricing is (slightly) restricted. Hence, the introduction of regional 
factors (RF)16 as a mark-up to the track access charges can be seen as an instrument to 
raise rivals’ costs in just another way. RF effect a spreading of access charges by a fac-
tor of 1.1 up to 2.45. They are imposed on railway lines of the regional passenger trans-
port (RPT). The DB AG explains the introduction of these charges with the need for 
reconstruction and the higher effort of maintenance regarding the respective railway 
lines: the RF of a line is positively co-related to its maintenance costs and negatively co-
related to its receipts. In average, the track access charges have increased about 18 %.17 
In Germany, the regional passenger transport is ordered by the federal states. On 
the one hand, the states can allocate the respective transport volume by a call for tender 
or, alternatively, they can place the order to a specific TOC directly. The contractual 
relationship between the federal state and the assigned TOC offers two possibilities: 
(1) Net-principle 
The TOC takes the risk of potentially occurring increase of costs. 
(2) Gross-principle 
The federal state takes the risk of such increase of costs. 
                                                 
14 A linear tariff ignores possible fixed costs digressions caused by high demand. 
15 See Aberle/Eisenkopf (2002) and Monopolkommission (2003).  
16 The German translation of this construct is ‘Regionalfaktoren’. 
17 See Zimmer (2003). 
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Considering the vertical integration of the DB AG, an increase of costs – produced 
by the introduction of RF – can be an instrument to raise rivals’ costs with the conse-
quence of the competitor abandoning the line. After this, the DB Regio as the regional 
carrier of the DB AG is able to serve the line. In the face of its high market share18 DB 
Regio can compensate a possible increase of costs (RF) by cross-subsidising from 
profit-yield lines. Furthermore, additional costs for DB Regio are additional profits for 
DB Netz, so this will be neutral for the DB AG (holding company) on balance. 
From all companies having answered, 18 private TOCs are producing regional pas-
senger transport what means about 37 % of the train-kilometres (private TOCs) of the 
target population and 71 % of the sample. The following Fig. 3 shows the number of 
concerned TOCs and the consequences. 
Performance (train-kilometres) 
From the introduction of re-
gional factors… Number of TOCs (RPT)
in % of target popula-
tion, TOCs (RPT) 
in % of response, 
TOCs (RPT) 
not concerned 8 13,8 37,3 
n/a, don’t know 2 1,8 4,8 
concerned 8 21,4 57,9 
increase of costs 5 13,8 37,4 
RPT at risk 1 4,8 13,0 
no increase of costs 2 2,8 7,5 
Total 18 37,0 100,0 
Fig. 3: Consequences of the regional factors of DB Netz for private TOCs 
Fig. 3 shows that eight (of 18) TOCs are concerned by the RF. The performance 
(train-kilometres) of these eight TOCs reflects about 58 % of the target population’s 
performance. Five of these TOCs state an increase of costs, and for one TOC the main-
tenance of transport is at risk (indication of net-principle). For two TOCs the RF do not 
interfere with their costs (indication of gross-principle). 
Having infrastructure and transport vertically integrated, the DB AG is able to raise 
rivals’ costs by introducing RF. The fact that lines being operated by competitors of the 
DB Regio are concerned predominantly by these factors points into direction of struc-
tural discrimination.19 Finally, the total competitiveness of the RPT-sector compared to 
the intermodal competition (road, bus) can be reduced because the federal states have a 
diminished scope for ordering transport volume due to higher costs.20 
                                                 
18 About 92 % in respect to the performed train-kilometres, 2002. See VDV (2003). 
19 See Quandt (2003). 
20 Given fixed financial resources for ordering (so-called ‘Regionalisierungsmittel’). 
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Traction power charges 
The transmission system for traction power also represents an essential facility be-
cause specific transport services have to be produced by electric traction, and no active 
and potential substitutes exist. The traction power charges sum up about 17 % of total 
transportation costs.21 Since 2004 the DB Energie as the operator of the grid has opened 
its network for alternative power producers. Hence, the TOCs can choose between a 
complete supply by DB Energie or a combined supply by a power producer (input 
power) and DB Energie (transmission). In the case of alternative input power, DB Ener-
gie requires grid access charges for transmitting the power from the producer to the 
TOC. In case of receiving power from DB Energie, the price is formed by the traction 
power charges system (TPCS). This system is linear and spread referring to time. In the 
survey, the TOCs were asked for the TPCS’ level and structure (advantages for buyers 
of high or low volumes). The following Fig. 4 shows the results: 
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Fig. 4: Traction power charges system (level and structure) 
Apparently, for 13 of 14 TOCs22 the level of power charges is (much) too high. 
Moreover, the compensation by DB Energie for backflow electricity is estimated as 
(much) too low by all TOCs. About 85 % are of the opinion that the TPCS bears a struc-
tural advantage for buyers of high power volumes. The price reduction steps in from a 
                                                 
21 See Handelsblatt (2003). 
22 This covers about 40 % of the TOCs relying on power supply by DB Energie; see Frankfurter Rund-
schau (2003). 
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volume higher than 500 GWh/year. This high purchase quantity seems to be reserved 
only for the DB-TOCs, which would be discriminatory.23 
Additionally, the TOCs were asked about their opinion about the forms of contract. 
Between 71 % and 100 % mention that the responsibility for payment in advance, the 
unilateral right to cancel by DB Energie, the declaration of line announcements and 
leasing of locomotives are critical because this means a transfer of sensitive data to a 
undertaking (DB Energie) which is vertically associated with competitors (DB-TOCs). 
With respect to the recent opening of the power grid for alternative power suppliers, the 
TOCs estimate predominantly positive effects on the security of supply, the flexibility 
and the development of the fare structure. 
3.2 Non-price discrimination 
Beyond price discrimination, non-price discrimination becomes a concern for a ver-
tically integrated network supplier.24 Compared to price discrimination, non-price dis-
crimination is hard to prove and, thus, to regulate by the competition or regulatory bod-
ies because of its wide range of opportunities. The following remarks reproduce the 
results of the survey regarding this (potential) behaviour. 
Requesting and allocation of railway slots 
In this section, the experience of TOCs regarding (potential) discrimination by DB 
Netz at railway slot25 allocation is presented. The TOCs were asked about the confor-
mance of requested slots and the slot allocation by DB Netz. 
                                                 
23 If price reductions are equivalent to economies of production, this reduction is “legal”. 
24 See Weisman and Kang (2001). 
25 A railway slot is the right to use a part of the railway network which is defined by time and position. 
See Aberle and Brenner (1996). 
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Fig. 5: Conformance of requested slots (by TOCs) and their allocation (by DB Netz) 
Fig. 5 indicates that the allocation of slots by DB Netz is predominantly in accor-
dance with their requesting (see average category). But, in individual cases the incentive 
to discriminate occurs. For instance, the Connex Regiobahn wants to access the LPT-
market on the connection Düsseldorf-Heidelberg via the old right Rhine-line (on which 
new capacities must have been arisen by the shifting of DB-capacities to the new high-
speed connection Cologne-Frankfurt).26 However, DB Netz only offered a long-time 
running slot with low attractiveness for passengers. This offers the conclusion of pro-
tecting the DB’s LPT-market by the DB’s infrastructure section. The survey does not 
represent a structural discriminatory behaviour by DB Netz. However, individual cases 
of discrimination regarding the line allocation are important. The EBA stated that DB 
Netz has preferred DB-TOCs at the allocation of lines (grandfather-principle) which 
must be corrected.27 
Allocation and compliance of railway slots 
Besides the discrimination by non-allocation of requested slots to private TOCs, 
DB Netz can protect their associated transport-TOCs by non-compliance of an allocated 
and contractually guaranteed slot. This discrepancy can be of temporal or geographical 
nature. The following Fig. 6 shows the amount of complied and non-complied slots 
within the scope of the questionnaire survey: 
                                                 
26 See Financial Times Deutschland (2002). 
27 See Eisenbahnbundesamt (2003). 
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Fig. 6: Compliance of allocated slots by DB Netz 
Fig. 6 shows similar results compared to Fig. 5. The once allocated slots were pre-
dominantly followed by DB Netz, especially regarding the slots for RPT. However, in 
some cases the allocated slot was not available.28 Here, some individual reasons hint 
towards specific obstacles for competitors: operating trouble, network parts with speed 
restriction, temporary shifted slots or loss of substance of the railway network. Like-
wise, slow and repeatedly interrupted – over several years – reconstructions of railways 
are stated as reasons. In the face of a “high” market share of one of these TOCs, the 
delay due to reconstruction can be classified as a deliberate strategy of hindrance. Also, 
a high potential of discrimination can be stated with regards to the vertical integration of 
DB Netz and the DB-transportation TOCs. 
Minimum standards for rolling stocks 
Another way for a vertically integrated rail infrastructure operator to create market 
entry barriers for competitors, and to protect the associated TOCs respectively, can be 
the setting of high standards for rolling stocks when using the infrastructure. 
The technical minimum standard for rolling stocks is set by the EBA (see § 4 Nr. 2 
Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz, AEG). Beyond this, DB Netz can define operational 
specifications. These requirements can cause a barrier to entry in the market especially 
for financially weak TOCs compared to the DB-TOCs. For example, the future Euro-
                                                 
28 In theory, this applies to all cases of the categories “predominantly”, “one half each” and “infre-
quently”. 
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pean Train Control System (ETCS) has already signified a shifting of technical equip-
ment from the infrastructure to the rolling stock. This discrimination occurs when the 
infrastructure operator’s requirements for using the infrastructure exceed the standard 
which is necessary for a safe maintenance (see § 3 Eisenbahninfrastruktur-
Benutzungsverordnung, EIBV).29 In the end, this can lead to a trade-off between an op-
timal safety standard and a non-discriminatory network access which can be affected by 
setting high standards for using the railway infrastructure. 
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Fig. 7: Minimum standards for rolling stock (EBA and DB Netz) 
As far as the predominant part of the TOCs is concerned, the rolling stock standards 
are suitable for both the technical standard by EBA and the operational standard by DB 
Netz (see Fig. 7). Of course, twice as many TOCs state that the standards of DB Netz 
are much too high compared to the EBA’s standard, but on a low level (N=6 and N=3, 
respectively). In principle, the survey cannot detect a specific discrimination by dispro-
portionate standard requirements of DB Netz. Overall, a similar evaluation of standards 
required by EBA and by DB Netz can be observed. 
Schedule information system 
Schedule information systems are an important instrument to supply transport ser-
vices to potential customers, particularly in the case of passenger transport.30 In connec-
                                                 
29 See Heinrichs (2003). 
30 Currently, Railion and the OHE are trying to implement a schedule information system for freight 
transport. See http://www.portal-c.info. 
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tion with the DB-railway network’s opening, the question arises whether the competi-
tors should have legal access to the DB’s schedule information system.31 To permit 
competitors’ access to the system, the DB-schedule information system has to be de-
fined as an essential facility (see definition on page 2). The Superior Court of Justice of 
Berlin obligates the DB to integrate two LPT-connections of Connex into their schedule 
system. Following this judgement, the system is an essential facility. On the other hand, 
the DB argues that they can not be committed to advertise the products of their competi-
tors. At first glance, this argument seems to be justifiable. Hence, it is possible for a 
competitor to duplicate a schedule information system with reasonable investment. This 
represents an existence of a potential substitute for the essential facility ‘schedule in-
formation system’. In contrast to this, as a matter of fact, the DB-TOCs have a dominant 
position in the related transport markets. From there, the DB AG must not take advan-
tage of this position to the debit of its competitors. Nevertheless, it is not the task of the 
regulatory or competition authorities to undertake the risk of the competitive TOCs. 
Before an essential facility’s operator is committed to open this facility, the petitioning 
companies should have attempted on their own to duplicate the facility by reasonable 
efforts. 
Despite this, a new perspective will occur if the railway network is separated and 
transferred to a new institution (see 4). This offers the opportunity to implement the 
schedule information system at this new institution.32 This solution makes it possible for 
all competitors – irrespective of their competitive relation – to use this independent 
schedule information service. 
Due to the judgement of the Superior Court of Justice of Berlin (see above), no 
TOC stated problems regarding the access to the DB’s schedule information system. 
Emergency services 
Likewise, the emergency service of the infrastructure operator is affected by the 
problem of discriminatory behaviour regarding the vertical relationship of the network 
operator and its associated transport companies.33 In theory, DB Netz has an incentive 
to prefer the DB-TOCs or to delay the emergency service of a private TOC. Of course, 
this incentive is limited, i.e. if the broken down train of a competitor effects delays on 
                                                 
31 Regarding RPT, the TOCs which are serving the state-ordered line are integrated into the schedule 
system of the DB AG. 
32 This separated and autonomous institution is also responsible for the slot management. Hence, an im-
plementation of the schedule information system at this institution seems to be obvious. 
33 In the view of RL 2001/14 EG, Art. 29 Abs. 1, the network operator is responsible for the disposal of 
service in case of a network failure caused by technical reasons or accidents. 
 14
the following or connected traffic. However, DB Netz is in a monopolistic position: The 
economical situation of small TOCs does not allow having their own emergency ser-
vice.34 They depend on the service of the infrastructure operator who orders this capac-
ity from the DB-TOCs. On the opposite, the DB-TOCs do not depend upon the network 
operator’s facilities, but due to their extensive fleet of vehicles they can make traction 
available to solve a problem. 
The DB Netz and the DB’s transport companies are monopolists regarding the 
emergency services. In general, there are no ex-ante contracts made between a (private) 
TOC and the network operator. The TOCs rely on the general right of emergency ser-
vices regarding RL 2001/14 EG. Hence, the network operator can take advantage of its 
monopoly: DB Netz can enforce high (monopolistic) prices for its service. Moreover, 
any broken-down train must be placed on a holding track which is owned by DB Netz, 
and the train must be picked up by the TOC. Therefore, additional charges must be paid 
to a monopolist. 
In the survey, 32 TOCs have mentioned maintenance failures. The following Fig. 8 
shows the reasons for broken-down trains and the kind of removal of these failures. 
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Fig. 8: Reasons for failures and kind of removal 
                                                 
34 Out of this reason and due to the – felt – discrimination of the DB AG regarding the emergency ser-
vices, some private TOCs has founded a private network to help each other in case of a train failure. See 
Netzwerk Privatbahnen: www.netzwerk-privatbahnen.de 
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With respect to Fig. 8, damage of traction ranks first on the list of failures. Up to 
40 % of the failures are solved by internal solutions, for example by own locomotives;35 
intervention by the network operator (23 %), cooperation with DB (21 %) and coopera-
tion with other private TOCs (16 %) are following. In the view of potential discrimina-
tion of the vertical integration, it would be interesting to see if the network operator DB 
Netz prefers its associated transport companies in case of emergency. The predominant 
part (60 %) of the TOCs cannot state a preferential treatment of DB-TOCs. On account 
of the sensibility of this point up to 27 % do not make any statement. Finally, 13 % state 
a preference of DB-TOCs. In view of 27 % of deniers this could be interpreted as a hint 
that, at least in individual cases, DB transport companies are preferred by DB Netz. The 
following reasons are given: 
 prompter service, 
 hints of weather problems predominantly for DB transport companies, 
 information of customers of DB-TOCs by DB Netz or DB Station & Service. 
Access to important and other basic facilities 
Besides the rail network there are other facilities which are important for producing 
rail transport and which are in possession of the DB AG. In relation to their nature, 
these capacities must be proved to be essential facilities (§ 19 Abs. 4 Nr. 4 GWB). In 
case of affirmation they must be opened for general access in exchange for adequate 
charges. The considered facilities are: 
 passenger stations, 
 marshalling yards, 
 sidings, 
 holding tracks, 
 filling stations, 
 work yards, 
 automobile-train installations, 
 maintenance plants and 
 washing-bays. 
In the survey the TOCs are asked whether the access to these facilities was denied, 
complicated, or trouble-free. Additionally, they could decide between ‘no requirement’ 
                                                 
35 This is a surprising result: In respect to the introducing consideration “cooperation” with DB must have 
been the most dominating case. 
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of the facilities or ‘not available’. The following Fig. 9 shows the results (N=333 in to-
tal): 
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Fig. 9: Conditions of access to important and basic DB-facilities 
Based on the results of the survey the access to passenger stations and automobile-
train installations36 is trouble-free. Denied access – with a low proportion, though – is 
stated in the cases of: 
 maintenance plants, 
 washing-bays (each 5 %), 
 marshalling yards, 
 sidings and 
 operation yards (each 3 %). 
First of all, the reasons are lacks of capacity or blocked capacities. In this connec-
tion, the complete leasing of facilities to DB-TOCs inhibited the access to those facili-
ties. Often, the capacities are not completely exploited by the DB-TOCs, hence, in prin-
ciple an access by other (private) TOCs would be possible. 
                                                 
36 The Nord-Ostsee-Bahn, Connex, (NOB) wanted access to the DB’s automobile-train facilities (loading 
ramps) to operate between Niebüll and Westerland. Although the NOB was given slots by DB Netz, it 
could not operate because of denied access to the specific automobile-train facilities. See Hamburger 
Abendblatt (2003). 
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Complicated access (anyhow, up to 17 % of all N) was mentioned for: 
 parking lines (49 %), 
 sidings (32 %), 
 marshalling yards (27 %), 
 maintenance plants (14 %), 
 washing-bays and operation yards (each 18 %) and 
 filling stations (8 %). 
These complications are also based on lacks of capacity (57 %), deconstructions, 
blocking of tracks and the complete leasing out of capacities to DB-TOCs. In addition, 
low flexibility and the search for an adequate contact person are rated as hindering. Fig. 
10 represents the reasons for complicated access: 
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Fig. 10: Reasons for complicated access to important DB-facilities (cp. Fig. 9) 
The number of explicit deny of access is relatively low. In contrast, complicated 
access is mentioned quite often. Especially the complete leasing out of facilities to DB-
TOCs is evident (no/low capacity). The results of this section refer to the hindering ef-
fects of the vertical integration of the railway infrastructure (DB Netz) and the transport 
level (DB-TOCs). Beyond the vertical integration, the dominant position of the DB AG 
in the downstream transport market plays a decisive role. This position ensures an ex-
cellent negotiating status to DB Netz – in relation to the weaker positions of private 
TOCs – and can be seen as a motivation from the perspective of the DB-holding com-
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pany to protect this dominant position, even by using discriminatory instruments given 
by the vertical integration. 
3.3 Conclusion of the survey 
The vertical integration of railway network and transport companies offers an in-
centive to minimise the competition in the downstream transport market. The vertical 
integration enables DB Netz to prefer the associated TOCs (DB Regio, DB Reise & 
Touristik, Railion) and to discriminate private TOCs, respectively. The kind of dis-
crimination can be divided into price and non-price discrimination (see 3.1 for price 
discrimination and 3.2 for non-price discrimination). The results of the survey of private 
TOCs partially confirm this discriminatory behaviour of the DB AG. 
Actual and, above all, potential discrimination are discovered at the following as-
pects: 
 Track access charges 
Due to the vertical integration the system of track access charges is built on the in-
terests of the holding company of the DB AG. Hence, the DB AG has an instrument 
to set structural market entry barriers by high prices or a discriminating access 
charge structure. Prejudicially, the DB Netz is not able to set a system which allo-
cates the network capacity in an economic reasonable way (i.e. two-part-tariffs, elas-
ticity-orientated price setting like Ramsey-pricing37). The results of the survey co-
relate with this behaviour: 80 % of the TOCs state a discriminatory treatment by 
high prices and more than 40 % by systematic advantages of the access charge struc-
ture for buyers of high volumes. 
 Regional factors 
Regional factors can be regarded as special case of access charges. Especially the 
fact that regional factors are charged on lines operated by competitors of the DB AG 
encourages the suggestion of a discriminatory behaviour by the vertically integrated 
DB AG. The DB AG attempts to protect the rail network against disentanglement by 
building regional network divisions. 
 Traction power charges 
The case of traction power charges can be economically compared to the problem of 
the network access charges. Both, noticeably high prices and advantages for buyers 
                                                 
37 See Ramsey (1927) and Braeutigam (1989). 
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of high power volumes arise from the survey. It is yet to observe whether the power 
network opening for alternative power suppliers causes positive effects for the com-
petition (lower prices, increasing competition). 
 Request and allocation of slots 
The integration of the network management into the DB-holding company – as a 
consequence of the integration of the physical railway network – offers the opportu-
nity to prefer the associated transportation TOCs concerning the allocation of re-
quested slots. The EBA detected such discriminatory behaviour with the conse-
quence that slot-allocation in consideration of captive company priorities is prohib-
ited.38 The survey covers, at least in individual cases, the statement of the EBA and 
points out disadvantages for private TOCs. Additionally, the supply of non-
competitive slots (i.e. detours or stops) also suggests such a discriminatory treat-
ment. 
 Allocation and compliance of slots 
Due to the vertical integration the infrastructure operator has an incentive (and the 
opportunity) to make a once allocated slot non-attractive for a competitive TOC. 
Predominantly, the survey does not confirm a general behaviour regarding this as-
pect. However, that fact that the infrastructure operator initiates constructions on the 
line which is operated by a competitive private TOC (RPT) suggests at least tenden-
cies towards this behaviour. Nevertheless, it is highly sophisticated to prove a struc-
tural discriminatory behaviour of DB Netz. 
 Emergency services 
Currently, the emergency services represent an essential facility. It is not possible 
for small private TOCs either to use any active substitute or to build up a potential 
substitute. Hence, a way must be found to organise an independent emergency ser-
vice or to regulate the existing one (responsible: DB Netz as infrastructure operator). 
Small private TOCs depend on solutions made between DB Netz and its associated 
transport companies. The survey provides two findings: a) Surprisingly, private 
TOCs can help themselves or in co-operation with other private TOCs in case of for 
example traction damage (about 56 %).39 b) The fact that 27 % deny an answer to 
the question if DB Netz prefers its associated transport companies and, anyhow, 
                                                 
38 So-called “Konstruktionsprinzipien”. See EBA (2003). 
39 In respect to the argument that emergency services are an essential facility (caused by the non-existence 
of active and potential substitutes), this result is contrary. 
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13 % stated a preferential treatment of DB-TOCs by DB Netz shows a possible dis-
crimination. 
 Access to important and other basic facilities 
Besides the rail network infrastructure, other facilities are important for producing 
rail transport services. These facilities as well as the rail network are owned by the 
DB AG. The same question occurs: Does the DB AG discriminate competitive pri-
vate TOCs concerning the access to these facilities? The results of the survey show 
that especially the access to holding tracks, sidings and marshalling yards is compli-
cated or partially denied.40 On an alleviated level this is also observable for mainte-
nance plants, washing-bays, work yards and filling stations. In the view of a possible 
regulation, it is yet to be proved whether the respective facility is an essential facil-
ity according to definition on page 2. Otherwise, the facility can be build by the peti-
tioner. 
 
Less and – at the moment well regulated – discrimination potential, respectively, 
can be stated as follows: 
 Minimum standards for rolling stocks 
Currently, the (potential) discrimination by exceeding requirements upon the rolling 
stock seems to be adequately regulated by the EBA.41 The EBA follows § 3 EIBV 
that a discrimination is given if the technical and operational requirements of an in-
frastructure operator exceed an equipment which is necessary for a secure transpor-
tation. 
 Access to schedule information system 
Due to the judgement of the Superior Court of Justice (Berlin), connections of DB-
competitors have to be integrated into the schedule information system of the DB 
AG. Hence, the survey detects no deny or complication of access for petitioners. 
                                                 
40 The predominant part is related to complications at the access to the respective facility. 
41 See EBA (2004). In dialogue with the EBA, the DB AG will not implement the GSM-R standard at 
once but successively and in conference with their regional subsidiaries. Hence, the TOCs have additional 
time to change over from analogue to digital (GSM-R-based) radio communication for trains. 
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4. The survey results and railway organisation and regulation 
The results of the survey noticeably show actual and potential discrimination by the 
DB AG which can be seen as a consequence of the vertical integration of railway infra-
structure – in a broader sense – and transport companies within the holding company 
DB AG. The dominant position of nearly all DB-TOCs on the transport markets intensi-
fies the incentive to protect this position by discrimination against competitive (private) 
TOCs.42 Based on the results of the survey, an implementation of an adequate railway 
organisation represents the next step. In general, two options are conceivable. Firstly, 
the momentary vertically integrated railway system of the DB AG persists. In this case, 
a ‘hard’ regulation must be found to restrict the discriminatory behaviour and potential 
of the DB AG. Secondly, the DB AG will be vertically separated. For this purpose, the 
railway network has to be materially separated from the DB AG. The transport compa-
nies can be materialised, too (i.e. by an initial public offer). In case of separation it must 
be proved if the loss of transaction cost advantages by an integrated production is com-
pensated by the positive (welfare) effects of the increasing competition.43 The solution 
of a separation requires a lower level of regulation than the vertically integrated option. 
Nevertheless, a natural monopolist – this will be an autonomous railway infrastructure 
operator due to economies of scale and economies of scope – must be regulated in re-
spect to the level of access charges. The greatest advantage of a vertical separation is the 
removal of the incentive for a former vertically integrated railway infrastructure opera-
tor to discriminate competitors of its associated transport companies. An autonomous 
infrastructure operator endeavours to optimise its capacity loads regardless of the peti-
tioner’s company membership. In the view of competition of the transport market, a 
vertical (and material) separation seems to be the most promising solution.44 
Beyond that, the question of the regulative organisation must be discussed. At the mo-
ment, the railway sector is controlled ex-post by the Federal Cartel Office (BKartA) in 
respect to general competitive abuse and, especially regarding the access to the railway 
network, by recurring to the essential facility-doctrine of § 19 Abs. 4 Nr. 4 GWB. Due 
                                                 
42 There is also discrimination between national railways, for example at the railway network access. The 
DB AG only grants access to its network on the reciprocal principle. The European Commission wants to 
enforce a Europe-wide and non-discriminative railway network access. See European Commission (2002) 
and European Commission (2004). 
43 For pitfalls regarding the restructuring of network industries with natural monopoly characteristics from 
the industrial organisation theory, see Buehler (2003). Main pitfalls are double marginalisation, underin-
vestment and vertical foreclosure. 
44 Positive welfare effects – based on the increasing competition – and losses of transaction cost advan-
tages must be compared. In general, transaction costs advantages rest on economies/costs savings through 
a vertically integrated production. It is difficult to empirically estimate these transaction cost savings. 
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to the dominant position of the DB AG on the transport markets, this control shows a 
level of imperfection. Possible and actual discriminations are discovered by the ex-post-
control only with temporal delay. Additionally, due to its dominant position the DB AG 
is able to delay processes and sanctions respectively. Hence, the competitor’s economic 
interest may be extinguished. 
In addition, the railway sector is regulated ex-ante by the EBA recurring to the prescrip-
tions of the AEG and EIBV. Since the latest amendment in 2001, the EBA has been 
authorised to take steps against discriminatory behaviour of a railway infrastructure 
operator ex officio. Prior to this amendment the EBA could only intervene when a TOC 
notified (possible) discrimination to the EBA. The ex officio-clause prevents temporal 
delays of ex-ante market control and regulation respectively. Possible disadvantages of 
this ex-ante regulation lie in the tendency to intervene even though discrimination does 
not exist. This instrument can also be abused by TOCs when they denounce discrimina-
tory behaviour to the EBA as a preventive precaution. 
In a next step, the organisation of the ex-ante regulative institution can be discussed 
which includes a decision between a sector-specific institution and a sector-overlapping 
institution. A sector-specific institution can provide expert knowledge and an intensive 
observance of the actual market. However, a disadvantage lies in the problem of phas-
ing-out. Once, an institution is implemented, it is hard to reduce its personnel body 
when the regulated sector does not need a specific regulation anymore.45 A phasing-out 
of a sector-overlapping institution can be moderated by distributing the phased-out sec-
tors’ regulating staff to other departments. A second problem of a sector-specific institu-
tion represents its so-called regulatory capture which means the influence of lobbyists 
on the staff of a regulatory body.46 This influence is more probable in case of sector-
specific institutions because the staff of sector-overlapping institutions can be assigned 
rotary between the alternative sectors. 
The general ex-post market control by the BKartA should not be influenced by the or-
ganisation of an ex-ante regulation. Furthermore, a competitive and co-operative control 
by both institutions can be established – the sector-overlapping regulatory body and the 
BKartA. 
                                                 
45 See Haucap and Kruse (2003). 
46 See Lanoie, Thomas and Fearnley (1998). 
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